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Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings in Ohio: Due
Process and the Hearsay Dilemma
T HE SUPREME COURT HAS LONG SINCE HELD that a necessary result of
due process requirements is the firm separation of the adjudica-
tory and dispositional phases of delinquency proceedings.1 As a corol-
lary to this, the juvenile is theoretically entitled to fundamental due
process safeguards in the adjudicatory stage, including the right to
exclude hearsay evidence.
The discrepancy between that which is theoretically available and
that which is actually extant is a function of the rules of procedure
of each jurisdiction as well as the attitudes of its appellate courts.
This comment will explore the extent to which the exclusion of hearsay
evidence in a delinquency proceeding is a practical reality in the Ohio
system. In so doing, the possibilities for abuse will be highlighted and
suggestions for their elimination will be made, all in the spirit of
the Supreme Court's mandate to provide fundamental due process
safeguards to this procedure.
Background
Within the past several years the fundamental concepts underlying
the juvenile court process have been closely examined, and the doc-
trine of parens patriae,2 standing alone, has been found inadequate.3
Its application has shown that the unbridled discretion of a juvenile
judge, however benevolent its motivation, is frequently a poor sub-
stitute for principle and procedure. 4 To remedy the abuses of the
traditional juvenile procedures the Supreme Court has held that they
must adhere to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.5 This
should not be taken to mean, however, that the full panoply of criminal
1 in re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (96-7) ; Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
2 The social theory that underlies the juvenile justice system is grounded in the
doctrine of parens patriae. This theory assumes a parental relationship between
the state and the child which would dispense with the need for certain procedural
protections.
Bayh, Juveniles and the Law: An Introduction, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 n.8 (1974).
3 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 85 (1967). An inherent weakness of
the doctrine of parens patriae is its failure to recognize that the juvenile courts serve
to punish offenders and protect society as well as the admitted purposes of protecting
and rehabilitating children. It has failed in both these stated goals. Children are not
protected because the informality engendered by the parens patriae doctrine creates the
potential for arbitrariness and unfettered discretion on the part of the juvenile court
judge and does not, in many cases, result in an accurate determination of the facts.
As a corollary to this "there is increasing evidence that the . . . seemingly all-powerful
and challengeless exercise of authority by judges and probation officers" is an obstacle
to rehabilitation. Id.
4 1
n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 18 (1967).
SKent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966).
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rights will be afforded to the juvenile. 6 Rather, the courts have sought
to effectuate a compromise between the two, avoiding both the harsh-
ness of an adversary proceeding and the granting of "unbridled dis-
cretion" to the juvenile judge.
An essential element of the attempt to treat fairly those juveniles
alleged to be delinquent is the bifurcated juvenile court system. An
adjudicatory hearing is held to determine the truth of the allegations
in the complaint.7 If these allegations are found to be true, the court
acquires jurisdiction over the child. A dispositional hearing is then
held at which time the judge decides upon the most remedial treat-
ment for the child.8
The Supreme Court of the United States has taken the lead in
separating the adjudicatory and dispositional stages of juvenile delin-
quency proceedings. The Court found, in 1966, that "there may be
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds:
that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."9 Thus, in
1967, the stage was set for the landmark case in juvenile law, In re
Gault.10 Limiting its holdings to adjudicatory hearings,11 the Court
found that neither the fourteenth amendment nor the Bill of Rights
is limited to adults.1 2 In extending such rights to juveniles, the Court
emphasized that the substantive benefits of the juvenile process should
be neither abandoned nor displaced by the states. 3
The Court feared that if it held juvenile proceedings to be criminal
in nature the flexibility of the process might be destroyed. However, it
could not ignore procedural irregularities in hearings from which
a loss of liberty might result 14 and to which a stigma was and is
attached. 5 Also considered by the Court in their application of con-
6 Id.
7 OHIO R. Juv. P. 2(1).
8 OHIO R. Juv. P. 2(8) and 34(A).
9 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
11 1d. at 27.
12Id. at 13.
13 Id. at 21.
14 Id. at 27. Accord, In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. App. 1953); In re Green, 123 Ind. App.
81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); In re Simmons, 299 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 1974); In re
Barkus, 168 Neb. 257, 95 N.W.2d 674 (1959); In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d
322 (Juv. Ct. 1969); In re B., 30 App. Div. 2d 442, 293 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1968);
In re Smith, 326 P.2d 835 (Olka. App. 1958).
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967):
While the juvenile court law provides that an adjudication . . . shall not be
deemed to be conviction of crime, nevertheless, . . This is a legal fiction. ...
(Continued on next page) 2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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stitutional safeguards was the fact that the incarceration of a juvenile
is, in many instances, for a much greater length of time than that
of an adult for the same criminal act.16 Perhaps the most persuasive
argument by the Court, however, was that to achieve the ideal of
rehabilitation, "the appearance as well as the actuality of fairness,
impartiality and orderliness - in short, the essentials of due pro-
cess - may be a more impressive and more therapeutic attitude so
far as the juvenile is concerned."17 And, of course, the rationale of
Pointer v. Texas,18 still holds true - the instruments of due process
enhance the possibility that the confrontation of opposing versions
and conflicting data will produce the truth.19
This concern for flexibility deserves greater consideration. To
what do the courts refer when they speak of the danger of sacrificing
flexibility? Is it merely a euphemism for judicial discretion, pater-
nalism or arbitrariness? A continual thread underlying the argu-
ments of the courts seems to be their desire to ensure that the juvenile
court takes jurisdiction only when a delinquent act has been com-
mitted.20 The bifurcated process outlined by the Supreme Court closely
parallels the procedures involved in a criminal proceeding. The trial
is analogous to a delinquency adjudication, and sentencing is similar
to the dispositional hearing.2 1 Indeed some recent decisions have termed
(Continued from preceding page)
It is common knowledge that such an adjudication when based upon
a charge of committing an act that amounts to a felony, is a blight upon the
character of and is a serious impediment to the future of such minor.
In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 789-90, 241 P.2d 631, 633 (1952). A "Juvenile
Court record is a lengthening chain that its riveted possessor will drag after him
through" life. Holmes Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 612, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955). See Mahoney, The Effect of Labeling Upon Youths
in the Juvenile Justice System: A Review of the Evidence, 8 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 583
(1974); Comment, Alternative Preadjudicatory Handling of Juveniles in South Dakota:
Time for Reform, 19 S.D. L. REV. 207 (1974). These articles point out that not only
does a stigma attach to those adjudicated delinquent with regard to obtaining jobs,
etc., but such an adjudication may become a self-fulfilling prophecy, encouraging future
delinquent behavior.
16 387 U.S. at 29.
17 Id. at 26.
18 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965).
"In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 21 (1967):
[T]o the extent that the rules of evidence are not merely technical or historical,
but like the hearsay rule have a sound basis in human experience, they should
not be rejected in any judicial inquiry.
Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79
HARv. L. REV. 775, 795 (1966). Cross-examination "is beyond a doubt the greatest
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367
(3d ed. 1940). C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 19 (2d ed. 1972).
20 Stamm, The Need for Juvenile Code Revision, 25 JUVENILE JUSTICE 14, 17 (August,
1974):
I read the recent Supreme Court cases broadly as standing for the principle
that when the juvenile court seeks to officially intervene in a child's life,
it will do so through the medium of due process.
21 Holmes Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 602, 109 A.2d 523, 526 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
973 (1955).
[Vol. 24:356
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delinquency proceedings quasi-criminal in nature.22 If the procedural
safeguards developed in the criminal law are those best designed to
serve justice, both by facilitating the search for truth and protect-
ing the rights of the accused, the clear similarities between criminal
and juvenile adjudication dictate that, lacking substantial reasons
to the contrary, procedural safeguards applied to the former should
be applied to the latter. Sincere concern for the well being of the
juvenile, however, has resulted in a rather informal procedure, which
in turn has lead to a fragmentary application of what should be
the juvenile's constitutionally guaranteed protections.23 The inevitable
difficulties are manifiest in the evidentiary problems presented by
hearsay and social reports.
The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure
The Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, promulgated by the Supreme
Court and approved by the State legislature, which took effect on
July 1, 1972, reflect the changes which have taken place in the courts'
attitudes towards juvenile offenders. They provide for a liberal inter-
pretation in order to promote justice, streamline procedure, and protect
the welfare both of children subject to the court's jurisdiction and
of the public.2 4 The child's rights are tempered by a strong emphasis
on the paternal aspect of juvenile court proceedings. This is consis-
tent with the procedures required by Gault, recognizing the juvenile's
rights at the adjudicatory hearing. The dispositional phase of the
proceedings, however, places great discretion in the juvenile court
judge.
Since the Supreme Court provided for the exclusion of hearsay
evidence in juvenile adjudicatory proceedings well before the adoption
of the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure, the Rules fail to deal directly
with this issue. Rule 34(B) (2), concerning dispositional hearings,
2In re Gregory W., 19 N.Y.2d 55, 62, 224 N.E.2d 102, 106, 277 N.Y.S.2d 675, 680
(1966).
2 McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). Trial by jury is the main constitutional
right which has been denied to those accused of juvenile delinquency in adjudicatory
hearings.
24 OHIO R. Juv. P. 1. More specifically the Rules provide:
(B) Construction.
These rules shall be liberally interpreted and construed so as to effectuate
the following purposes:
(1) to effect the just determination of every juvenile court proceeding
by ensuring the parties a fair hearing and the recognition and enforcement of
their constitutional and other legal rights;
(2) to secure simplicity and uniformity in procedure, fairness in administra-
tion, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay;
(3) to provide for the care, protection, and mental and physical develop-
ment of children subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and to
protect the welfare of the community; and
(4) to protect the public interest by treating children as persons in need
of supervision, care and rehabilitation. 4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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states that hearsay evidence may be admitted, whereas Rule 29 (E) (3),
provides that in the adjudicatory hearing the court shall "[t]ake all
testimony under oath or affirmation in either question-answer or
narrative form . . . ." It may be argued that the latter rule prohibits
the use of hearsay, but the evidentiary trustworthiness that the rule
against hearsay is designed to guarantee exists not only when the
witness or declarant is under oath but also when he is present in the
courtroom and available for cross-examination. 2 If Rule 29(E) (3)
is properly interpreted to exclude hearsay in the adjudicatory hear-
ings, one aspect of the differences between the dispositional and
adjudicatory phases becomes apparent. The skeleton of constitutional
safeguards necessary in the adjudicatory proceeding are, on the
whole, not present (nor desirable) in the dispositional phase. Regret-
tably, the procedural distinctions between the two phases are often
relaxed due to burdensome case loads and the ensuing quest for
expediency. 26
One particular form of hearsay, the social history, is excluded from
consideration in the adjudicatory stage by Rule 32.27 Social histories
(also referred to as social studies or probation reports) are prepared
by the probation officer for the benefit of the court in the dispositional
phase of the proceedings. They include the personal and family
history of the child and any prior record he might have. 28 The reports
contain information obtained from the child's parents, school, and
any social agencies with which he or his family has been involved.29
Rule 32 delineates specific instances in which the social histories may
be considered by the juvenile court judge in delinquency adjudica-
tions. They are: (1) when the juvenile so requests,30 and (2) when
the legal responsibility for the juvenile's acts is an issue.3 Further-
5 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940); C. MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE § 245(2d ed. 1972).
26 While informality is the theme of a juvenile court hearing,
informality should not, however, mean that the court ceases to be a court or
becomes merely a conference in the judge's chambers. Still less should it mean
that the court ignores rules of evidence or fails to establish procedures for its
actions. Rather, informality means an absence of those technicalities which are
not essential to justice and which tend to confuse or intimidate a child.
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, STANDARDS FOR SPECIALIZED
COURTS DEALING WITH CHILDREN 54 (1954).
2 OHIO R. Juv. P. 32.
2 OHIO R. Juv. P. 2 (21).
2 9 Interviews with three probation officers, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, between
December, 1974, and March, 1975. (Two of the officers are no longer employed by the
court, but all have requested to remain anonymous).
30 OHIO R. Juv. P. 32(A) (1).
31 OHIO R. JUv. P. 32(A) (4). Prior to Gault, juvenile courts often received social histories
in lieu of or in addition to actual witnesses at the hearing. The informality of the pro-
cedure as it then existed coupled with a loosely conceived business records-official docu-
ments exception to the hearsay rule seems to have provided the propelling force behind
(Continued on next page)
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more, when, under the exceptions of Rule 32(A), a social history is
being used by the judge, Rule 32(B) requires that its use be con-
fined to the purposes of the exception.3 2
Case Law
Among the rights afforded juveniles by Gault is the sixth amend-
ment right of confrontation and cross-examination.3 3 The sixth amend-
ment had previously been held applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment in Pointer v. Texas,34 where the Court recog-
nized the importance of cross-examination in exposing falsehood and
eliciting the truth.35 Ohio case law has followed the Gault decision,36
and the rule prohibiting hearsay has been recognized in other jurisdic-
tions both prior to and as a result of Gault.3 No Ohio cases have been
found regarding the admission of social histories at the adjudica-
tory stage, although some do exist in other jurisdictions.38 One Ohio
case, involving the use of similar reports in the dispositional phase,
(Continued from preceding page)
admission. See Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. REV. 471, 493 n. 145
(1958). Since Gault had constitutionally eliminated some of the prior informality, and
in the absence of rules such as Ohio's Rule 32 generally prohibiting the use of social
histories in adjudications, social histories would not seem admissible into evidence as a
business record exception to the hearsay rule due to the lack of a duty to record on the
informants. See Yates v. Bair Transport, Inc., 249 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Kelly
v. Wasserman, 5 N.Y.2d 425, 158 N.E.2d 241, 185 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1959); Johnson
v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930). See also RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 803 (6) (effective July 1, 1975) and the accompany-
ing Advisory Committee's Note thereto.
It should be noted that Rule 32(A) enumerates 6 instances where social histories
may be used by the court, however, only 32(A) (1) and (4) are applicable to delin-
quency adjudications. 32 (A) (3) relates to neglect and dependency proceedings; 32 (A) (2)
relates to bindover proceedings; and 32(A) (5) and (6) concern reports of mental
and physical examinations.
32 OHIO R. Juv. P. 32(B).
33387 U.S. at 57:
We now hold that, absent a valid confession, a determination of delinquency
and an order of commitment to a state institution cannot be sustained in the
absence of sworn testimony subjected to the opportunity for cross-examination
in accordance with our law and constitutional requirements.
- 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
3s Id. at 404. It should be noted that the sixth amendment right of confrontation and the
rule against hearsay have not been held to be the same thing. See C. McCORMICK § 252
(2d ed. 1972), and cases cited therein for a discussion of this distinction.
36 In re Tsesmilles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 308 (1970).
37E.g., In re Gladys R., 1 Cal.3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970); In re
B.L.M., 30 Colo. App. 106, 500 P.2d 146 (1972); In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C.
App. 1953); In re Green, 123 Ind. App. 81, 108 N.E.2d 647 (1952); In re Simon,
295 So. 2d 473 (La. App. 1974); In re Cromwell, 232 Md. 409, 194 A.2d 88 (1963);
In re Gressett, ........... Miss ............- , 272 So. 2d 921 (1973); In re Barkus, 168 Neb. 257,
95 N.W.2d 674 (1959); In re D.C., 114 N.J. Super. 499, 277 A.2d 402 (App. Div.
1971); In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 268 A.2d 170 (1970); Ballard v. State, 192
S.W.2d 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946); Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d 299, 201 N.W.2d
832 (1972); Gilbert v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 142, 198 S.E.2d 633 (1973).
3E.g., In re Corey, 266 Cal. App. 2d 295, 72 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1968); In re Simmons, 299
So. 2d 906 (La. Ct. App. 1974); In re A.H., 115 N.J. Super. 268, 279 A.2d 133 (App.
Div. 1971). 6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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stated that "[u] nlike in the adjudicatory hearing, in the dispositional
hearing the clinical reports are not only admissible but are frequently
indispensible. 39
Concern has been expressed by the Ohio Supreme Court that an
infusion of all the rights or features provided in criminal cases, other
than those essential to due process generally would destroy the
individualized, remedial nature of adjudication. 40 In spite of this
evident desire to maintain flexibility in the juvenile system, the court,
prior to Gault and the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, has refused to
allow the introduction of hearsay which would benefit the child on
the ground that the declarant was available.41
The Possibilities for Abuse Under Present Law
The scarcity of decisions dealing with the use of hearsay evidence
in juvenile delinquency adjudications results not from the rarity of
its admision in these proceedings, but rather from the difficulties in-
volved in perfecting appeals of juvenile court decisions. There are
several practical reasons for the lack of effective appellate review:
the typical juvenile commitment is for only six to nine months, and
appeals are difficult to prosecute within such a short period of time;
generally children are more passive than adults about asserting their
legal rights; appellate courts are often unwilling to overturn juvenile
decisions because they think that juvenile judges possess special
expertise; and records of juvenile court proceedings are not always
prepared. 42 These obstacles eliminate the normal checks on a juvenile
judge's power and thus give him great latitude regarding the admis-
sion of hearsay evidence.
Social study reports present a more complex problem than does
hearsay evidence. There are no ambuiguities in the rules regarding
their preparation and use. Rule 32(B) clearly prohibits the court
from ordering a social s until there has been either an admis-
sion or an adjudication of delinquency. Surveys conducted both prior
to and after Gault have revealed a widespread use of social histories
by juvenile court judges before the child had been adjudged delin-
39 In re J.F., 17 Ohio Misc. 40, 43, 242 N.E.2d 604, 606 (Juv. Ct. 1968). Note that this
decision was rendered four years before the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure took effect.
4 0In re Agler, 19 Ohio St. 2d 70, 79, 249 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1969).
41 In re Tsesmilles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 308 (1970).
42 Nejelski and LaPook, Monitoring the Juvenile Justice System: How Can You Tell Where
You're Going, If You Don't Know Where You Are?, 12 AM. CalM. L. REV. 9, 19-20
(1974). It should be noted that although the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court has
made provisions for recording juvenile proceedings, the recording equipment often
does not work properly, and the transcribing department is overworked. Rule 37 of the
Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure provides that a court reporter may be requested, but
the request must be made in advance and, of course, paid for by the requesting party.
Thus, a transcript is a luxury not seen in many delinquency adjudications.
[Vol. 24:356
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quent.43 The mandates of Gault and passage of the Ohio Rules of
Juvenile Procedure do not appear to have supplied the expected
panacea. The injunction on the use of social histories is often over-
looked in Ohio; indeed, it is obvious that, in view of the time required
to prepare the history, the prohibition must be ignored wherever the
dispositional hearing is conducted immediately after the delinquency
adjudication.
The current procedures regarding social histories in the Cuyahoga
County Juvenile Court illustrate the problem. They have been ex-
plained by officers of that court to be as follows:" Approximately
one week after the filing of a complaint with the juvenile court, the
probation department is notified that a social history must be prepared.
The probation officers normally allow two weeks to complete these
reports. This means that they are usually ready approximately one
week before the adjudicatory hearing, as the hearings are scheduled
to take place one month after the filing of the complaint.4 The reports
are sent by the probation department's records room to the bailiff
of the judge hearing the case at around three-thirty or four o'clock
p.m. on the day before the adjudicatory hearing. The bailiff then
places the report in the alleged delinquent's file. The file is given
to the judge before the child is brought into the courtroom. The
probation officer appears at the hearing. At the close of the adjudica-
tory stage, the dispositional phase begins immediately. At that point
the probation officer makes a verbal summary of his findings and
recommendations while the judge is glancing over the social study
report, supposedly for the first time.
The Cuyahoga County procedure undermines the spirit of Rule
32. Placing the report in the custody of the bailiff before the adjudi-
catory hearing makes it available to the judge. Even if the judge
refrains from actually reading the report, prejudice to the juvenile
may result because the judge cannot help noticing both the summary
sheet attached to the front of the folder containing the report and
the thickness of the report itself.46 In order to maintain the integrity
of the bifurcated juvenile court system, the adjudicatory stage must
be completely separated from the dispositional phase. If the juvenile
judge has the opportunity to review the report before the adjudicatory
43See generally Rose, Adjudication, 16 ARIz. L. REV. 325 (1974); Note, Employment Of
Social Investigation Reports in Juvenile Proceedings, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 702 (1958);
Note, The California Juvenile Court, 10 STAN. L. REV. 471 (1958); 5 SYRACUSE L. REV.
67 (1954).
4 4 Interviews with probation officers and bailiff, Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court, between
December, 1974 and March, 1975.
4 OHIO R. Juv. P. 29(A) provides an exception where a child is in the detention home.
In that situation the adjudicatory hearing may not be held more than ten days after the
filing of the complaint unless good cause is shown.
4 As a matter of practice, the report is usually accompanied by a summary sheet attached to
the face of the report. The reports may vary as much as one inch in thickness depending
upon the juvenile's past record. 8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
hearing this separation is destroyed. The courts will not countenance
any intermingling of the two, 7 because "[this procedure affords a
necessary protection against the premature resolution of the juris-
dictional issue on the basis of legally incompetent material in the
social report."4 Moreover, it does not matter whether the juvenile
judge actually reads the report or not. What is important is that he
has the opportunity to do so. Even the appearance of impropriety
should be avoided. 49
The Inadequacy of Appellate Review
It has been shown that problems exist not only with respect to
the admission of witnesses' testimony including hearsay at the adjudi-
catory hearing,5 but also regarding the social histories prepared
ostensibly for the dispositional phase. How have the appellate courts
dealt with these issues? Is any meaningful review possible? By what
standards have appellate courts reviewed juvenile court proceedings
when the admission of hearsay is the only error alleged?
In juvenile court proceedings the judge is the trier of fact."1 Three
basic approaches may be taken with regard to hearsay evidence in
non-jury trials. The reviewing court may presume that the lower court
disregarded improper evidence. s2 The reviewing court may require
some assurance from the lower court that it did not consider improper
evidence, such as a statement to that effect.5 3 The remaining juris-
dictions take a stricter view applying the same exclusionary rules
to both jury and non-jury trials.5 Ohio falls into the first category,
and will not reverse a decision unless it is shown to be prejudicial
to the defendant or that the improper evidence was relied upon in
reaching the conclusion that the triers of fact did reach.
55
4 7 See In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970); In re Corey,
266 Cal. App. 2d 295, 72 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1968); In re Simon, 295 So. 2d 473 (La.
App. 1974); In re Simmons, 299 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 1974); In re Arnold, 12 Md.
App. 384, 278 A.2d 658 (1971).
48In re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 859-60, 464 P.2d 127, 130-31, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671,
674-75 (1970).
49 In re A.H., 115 N.J. Super. 268, 279 A.2d 133 (App. Div. 1971); ABA CANONS OF
JUDICIAL ETHICS Nos. 4 and 34 (1971).
50 Members of the Arizona Law Review conducted a study on Arizona juvenile courts which
substantiated charges that juvenile court judges in Pima County "'would allow almost any
sort of hearsay to be admitted." Rose, Adjudication, 16 ARiZ. L. REv. 325, 357 (1974).
s1 OHIO R. Juv. P. 29 (E) (4).
52 Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HARv. L. REv. 407
(1965).
OId. at 408.
4 Id.
5 See State v. Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St. 2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 890
(1972); State v. Bolan, 27 Ohio St. 2d 15, 271 N.E.2d 839 (1971); In re Agler, 19
Ohio St. 2d 70, 249 N.E.2d 808 (1969); State v. Shardell, 107 Ohio App. 338, 153
N.E.2d 510 (1958); In re Baker, 18 Ohio App. 2d 276, 283, 248 N.E.2d 620, 625
(1969); State v. Blanton, 111 Ohio App. 111, 170 N.E.2d 754 (1960).
[Vol. 24 :356
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Cases protesting the use of hearsay evidence in juvenile delin-
quency adjudications in Ohio are few, but it is clear that Ohio courts
take the most liberal view with regard to its introduction. The Supreme
Court and courts of appeals are disinclined to interfere with the
decisions of trial judges when they admit or refuse to admit hearsay.
It should be noted, however, that in the case where introduction was
prohibited, such introduction was sought by the child.
6
It seems obvious that an adjudication of delinquency based en-
tirely on hearsay will not be upheld. Most reviewing courts have held
that since the hearsay was inadmissible in the first instance, they will
consider the sufficiency of the evidence disregarding that which was
improperly admitted. Thus, many cases are reversed for lack of
competent legal evidence.5 7 The converse is also true; where the bur-
den of proof is met without resort to the hearsay evidence, its ad-
mission will be held harmless error.58 This application of the "bald
presumption" theory, 9 whereby the appellate court assumes that
the trial court disregarded any improper evidence, has an inherent
weakness. It is unrealistic to assume that a juvenile court judge
can simply put out of his mind any hearsay evidence which is pre-
sented in the course of a juvenile delinquency adjudication. 6
Other jurisdictions will overlook the admission of hearsay evidence
when the trial judge has made a statement in the record which
indicates that it has been disregarded. 61 It logically follows that
when the judge reveals that he has not cast the hearsay out of his
561n re Tsesmilles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 308 (1970).
5SeeIn re V., 10 Cal. App. 3d 676, 517 P.2d 1145, 111 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974); In re D.J.B.,
18 Cal. App. 3d 782, 96 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971); In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787,
241 P.2d 631 (1952); People v. Pitt, 133 Ill. App. 2d 859, 272 N.E.2d 250 (1971);
In re Gressett ............ Miss ........... ,272 So. 2d 921 (1973); In re Sanders, 168 Neb. 458,
96 N.W.2d 218 (1959); In re D.C., 114 N.J. Super. 499, 277 A.2d 402 (App. Div.
1971); Sorrels v. Steele, 506 P.2d 942 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973). Cf. In re J.D., 513
P.2d 654 (Alas. 1973).
58In re Dunston, 12 N.C. App. 33, 182 S.E.2d 9 (1971); Rusecki v. State, 56 Wis. 2d
299, 201 N.W.2d 832 (1972); In re Bentley, 246 Wis. 69, 16 N.W.2d 390 (1944).
59 Note, Improper Evidence in Nonjury Trials: Basis for Reversal?, 79 HARV. L. REV. 407,
409 (1965).
60 On crucial presupposition of the juvenile court philosophy - a mature and sophis-
ticated judge, wise and well versed in law and the science of human behavior
- has proved in fact to often unattainable.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 80 (1967). If the reader has any doubts
on this subject, he is urged to consult D. JACKSON, JUDGES (1974).
[N]o matter how trained and experienced a Juvenile Court judge may be,
he cannot by any magical fishing rod draw forth the truth out of a confused sea
of speculation, rumor, suspicion and hearsay.
Holmes Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 614, 109 A.2d 523, 529 (1954) (dissenting opinion),
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 973 (1955).
67In re Joseph G., 7 Cal. App. 3d 695, 87 Cal. Rptr. 25 (1970); In re A.H., 115 N.J.
Super. 268, 279 A.2d 133 (App. Div. 1971). 10https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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mind, his decision will be reversed. 62 The rationale of the decisions 63
taking this position are much the same as those behind Gault, but,
unfortunately, the results are not as encouraging.
The basic conflict between a judge's discretion and procedural
regularity is thus presented. Flexibility is desired, but so is fair
treatment. What compromise may be reached? How can the juvenile's
right to fundamental due process and fair treatment and the interests
of the state be balanced?
Recommendations
As always, it is difficult to ascertain which procedures will best
ensure the administration of justice. However, the Supreme Court
has mandated the separation of the adjudicatory and the dispositional
phases of juvenile delinquency proceedings. The following recom-
mendations endeavor to bring current practices in Ohio closer to the
intent of the Supreme Court by helping to eliminate the potential
for abuse inherent in the present Rules and to make effective appellate
review possible.
Appellate Review
It is not within the scope of this comment to examine in depth the
various methods for improving appellate review, however, one recom-
mendation will be made in this respect. Rule 29 (F) (3) of the Rules
of Juvenile Procedure provides that the court shall "make written
findings of fact and conclusions of law" upon request. This should
be a mandatory procedure. Where this is done, the reviewing court
would not have to resort to assumptions and presumptions which
amount to mere speculation and conjecture to determine upon what
facts the juvenile court judge based his findings. Balancing the bene-
fits of this requirement to the juvenile against the time and effort
which the juvenile judge would be required to expend, there seems to
be no doubt that the interests of the juvenile must prevail."
Simply relying on a general statement by the juvenile court judge
that improper evidence was not considered will not be enough. Such
a statement would become a standard part of every juvenile delin-
quency adjudication. The judge must state specifically what evidence
his decision is based on and which evidence he excluded from con-
sideration. With this type of requirement, the judge would be forced
to weigh the facts carefully and objectively.
62I, re Gladys R., 1 Cal. 3d 855, 464 P.2d 127, 83 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1970); In re Steven
F., 270 Cal. App. 2d 603, 75 Cal. Rptr. 887 (1969).
63 In re Sippy, 97 A.2d 455 (D.C. App. 1953); In re Simmons, 299 So. 2d 906 (La. App.
1974); In re Sanders, 168 Neb. 458, 96 N.W.2d 218 (1959); In re Steven B., 30 App.
Div. 2d 442, 293 N.Y.S.2d 946 (1968); In re H.C., 106 N.J. Super. 583, 256 A.2d 322
(Juv. Ct. 1969).
"OHIO R. Juv. P. 1. Note that the constitutional rights purpose precedes the expediency
purpose.
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Social Study Reports
The problem presented by the fact that the social histories are
available to the juvenile court judge before the child has been
adjudicated delinquent is capable of a simple solution. One recom-
mendation for the elimination of this danger is that a rule should
be promulgated which would require a representative of the probation
department to verify that the probation report was not given to the
judge before the child had been adjudged delinquent. 65 The judge
should be able to order the probation report whenever he wants,6
but it should not be available to him until delinquency has been
established (except as already provided in Rules 32 (A) (1) and (4) ).
Under this procedure the records office of the probation department
could hold the social studies until the day of the hearing, and the
probation officer could pick up the reports on his way to the hearing.
He could then hand the social history to the judge before he sum-
marized its contents. The juvenile judges might object to this pro-
cedure because they would not be sure that the reports were ready
until the probation officer handed them to the judges. This objection
could easily be satisfied by a daily written list from the probation
department employee in the records office to the bailiff, naming those
persons upon whom reports have been completed for use at the fol-
lowing day's hearings. In the event this procedure was adopted an
additional provision would be required for the destruction of these
reports if the child was not found to be delinquent.
The weaknesses inherent in such a procedure are obvious. Its
enforcement would be extremely difficult and would be complicated
by the facts that juvenile court employees are anxious to please the
judges, and many judges see nothing wrong with perusing the social
history prior to or during the adjudicatory hearing. Therefore, it is
proposed that the premature use of social histories be prevented by
strict enforcement of Rule 32 (B) prohibiting their preparation or use
prior to an adjudication of delinquency. If this procedure were followed
there would be no need to destroy reports on juveniles found not to
65 Such a rule was proposed in Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A Re-evaluation, 19
HASTINGS L. J. 47, 94 (1967) (emphasis added) :
The probation officer should be expressly prohibited from furnishing, and the
judge from receiving or reading, the probation report until such time as an
adjudication has been made.
At least one judge has informally adopted such a policy:
This writer not only avoids looking at the record, but has instructed the court
personnel not to even place the record on the bench so that its thickness or
thinness can be observed.
Klein, A Practical Look at the New Juvenile Act, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 186, 210 (1973).
66 In this way, there would be no unnecessary delay between the adjudication of delinquency
and the dispositional hearing. The attitude of juvenile court judges to the prohibition
against ordering social studies prior to an adjudication of delinquency is illustrated by
Klein, A Practical Look at the New Juvenile Act, 12 DUQUESNE L. REV. 186, 209 (1973),
where a judge characterizes such a rule as "impractical, inane, and counterproductive." 12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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be delinquent because there would be no such reports prepared in
the first place. More importantly, in the vast majority of cases where
the juvenile is not confined to the detention home, the child would
gain substantial benefits. Generally counsel for a juvenile in a con-
tested delinquency proceeding has little time to prepare for the hearing,
and naturally preparation relating to the adjudicatory stage takes
precedence over that relating to the disposition. Thus, a delay between
the two stages would create an advantage for the child because his
attorney would be able to adequately prepare for the dispositional
hearing. The delay involved would not be too great because, as indi-
cated previously, it takes approximately two weeks to prepare a social
study report. Balancing the child's right to a dispositional hearing
immediately following adjudication67 against the assurance that the
judge could not consider the report when determining the issue of
delinquency and the greater probability of adequate representation
at the dispositional hearing, it would seem that a strict enforcement
of Rule 32(B) is preferable.
The arguments for implementation of one of the above recom-
mendations are overwhelming. Under the present system in Cuyahoga
County, for example, a juvenile judge may read the report before
the adjudicatory hearing. The child may be prejudiced by the judge's
perusal of the hearsay and irrelevant comments contained therein.
In all likelihood there is no remedy available since, unless it is apparent
from the record that the judge read the report, the court of appeals
will not interfere. Not many children accused of delinquency have
the funds to pay a court reporter, and would be unable to catch the
judge's "slip" even if he made one. A child's constitutional rights
should not be made to depend upon the whim of a juvenile court judge.
Hearsay During the Adjudicatory Hearing
Rule 29 of the Rules of Juvenile Procedure should be amended to
expressly prohibit the use of hearsay evidence except at the request
of the child. There are times when the juvenile may wish to intro-
duce hearsay evidence which might benefit him. Two recent cases, one
in Ohio and one in Pennsylvania have dealt with this situation. The
Pennsylvania case,68 decided in 1970, involved an attempt by the
child to question a police officer regarding any prior inconsistent
statements that the state's principal witness might have made to
him. The juvenile court judge sustained an objection, but the deci-
sion was overturned. The Ohio case,6" also decided in 1970, involved
an attempt by the child to enter as an exhibit a medical examination
67 OHIo R. Juv. P. 34 (A).
6In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 268 A.2d 170 (1970).
69 In re Tsesmilles, 24 Ohio App. 2d 153, 265 N.E.2d 308 (1970).
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requested by the state and made before the trial. The child was denied
the right to enter the report because the examiner was available and
this holding was sustained.
The result reached by the Pennsylvania court is the more desirable.
The court concluded that "strict adherence to the technicalities of
the rules of hearsay does not necessarily lead to the most just find-
ing."7 0 Commentary on this decision 71 has advocated the adoption of
the position whereby the juvenile could benefit from the hearsay
rule both by excluding those things detrimental to him and by intro-
ducing favorable evidence.72 By allowing the child to exclude hearsay
testimony, he is able to exercise his constitutional rights as guaranteed
by Gault. It must be remembered that even though the juvenile pro-
ceedings are adversary in nature, it is not always true that when
one side receives a benefit the other suffers a detriment. In this
situation the main interest of the state is seeing justice done. A
rule such as the one proposed seems to be the type of informality that
was contemplated in the desire to retain flexibility in juvenile
procedures.
Until Rule 29 is so amended, it should be remembered that Rule
32(A) (1) provides a method by which the child can introduce one
form of hearsay, his social history, at the adjudicatory hearing. It
is a tool worth consideration. Of course the juvenile cannot control
what goes into the report nor what subjects it covers, but in most
cases the probation officer who prepares the report will investigate
matters favorable to the juvenile if he is so requested.
Conclusion
Among the rights granted to juveniles by Gault was the right
not to have hearsay evidence considered by the trier of fact when
determining delinquency. Ohio practice is still (eight years later)
unable to guarantee juveniles this right. The Ohio Rules of Juvenile
Procedure do not clearly prohibit the use of hearsay evidence in
delinquency adjudications, and judicial review of these decisions has
not been effective in discouraging its use. A particular problem is
presented by the premature use of social histories. Although the rules
prohibit their preparation prior to an adjudication of delinquency,
this provision is generally ignored for reasons of expediency. This
70In re Farms, 216 Pa. Super. 445, 450, 268 A.2d 170,175 (1970).
719 DUQUESNE L. REv. 696 (1971).
72 Such a rule has been advocated with regard to criminal proceedings. "A miscarriage of
justice should not be risked by shutting out any evidence for the defense, even though it
may be hearsay." D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAN & J. WALTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
EVIDENCE 59 (2d ed. 1972). 14https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss2/8
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practice allows the judge access to the social histories consisting mostly
of hearsay and irrelevant material prior to his decision regarding
delinquency.
These problems illustrate the subversion of the Supreme Court's
intent to create a bifurcated system. The modifications to Rules 29
and 32 of the Ohio Rules of Juvenile Procedure would leave no doubt
as to the impropriety of considering hearsay evidence when determin-
ing delinquency, and requiring written findings of fact and conclusions
of law would greatly facilitate the task of reviewing courts. The
solutions presented will not revolutionize the field of juvenile law,
but they are an important step toward complying with the Gault
decision and should thus be adopted.
Sara E. Strattan
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